Leaving a Legacy

How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh

A Case Study

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Leaving a Legacy
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February 2018

Authors: Tim Gamper
Dr. Asif Shahan
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Design and Print Arka
Agribusiness for Trade Competitiveness Project (ATC-P), branded as Katalyst, is a pioneer market systems development project contributing to sustainable poverty reduction in Bangladesh. Implemented by Swisscontact under the umbrella of the Ministry of Commerce of the Government of Bangladesh, Katalyst has been operating in Bangladesh since 2003. Phase 3 (March 2014 to March 2018) is the project’s current and final phase, and is co-funded by UK Aid, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Danish International Development Agency (Danida). During the past 14 years, Katalyst has benefited over 4.7 million farmers and small and medium enterprises in Bangladesh with an additional income increase of USD 691 million.

In Phase 3, Katalyst has focused on three core sectors (fish, vegetable and maize), three cross sectors (local agribusiness network, women’s economic empowerment and information channels) and the overarching theme of capitalisation. Katalyst defines capitalisation as a process of capturing the project’s learning, and of anchoring its experience within national level institutions.

The rationale of capitalisation for Katalyst is that the facilitative, indirect approach, knowledge and experience practiced by the project could be utilised by a greater number of well-positioned stakeholders, including members of academia, think tanks, public organisations, research organisations and the media. A greater number of stakeholders promoting a systemic approach similar to that adopted by Katalyst means a far greater level of outreach and impact, resulting in both direct and indirect benefits to the poor. This concept of capitalisation was thus made an integral part of Katalyst’s strategy for Phase 3.

Throughout Phase 3, Katalyst engaged with over 13 stakeholders to anchor its experience. This case study specifically deals with this engagement and the learning obtained from these institutional anchoring processes.

This case study, Leaving a Legacy: How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh, has been prepared by Tim Gamper and Dr. Asif Shahan. Mr. Gamper is a seasoned market development specialist with prior experience of working in Bangladesh and South East Asia. Dr. Shahan is an academician with expertise in institutional governance, particularly public sector organisations.

By reading this case study, we believe that a development practitioner will be able to explain why it is useful for a market system development project like Katalyst to undertake anchoring initiatives, and when and how to design and implement anchoring interventions. An important aspect of the case study is that the writers have provided guidelines or recommendations on capitalisation, and have drawn directly from Katalyst’s experiences to do so.

I offer my sincere thanks to the authors for their painstaking work. Many thanks are also due to Markus Kupper at Swisscontact headquarters; Manish Pandey, Regional Director South Asia; Prashant Rana, Regional Director South East Asia; and Anirban Bhowmik, Country Director Bangladesh; for reviewing the draft version and providing their valuable comments. Last but not least, my thanks go to our anchoring partners and to Katalyst staff, who diligently supported the authors in preparing this case study.

Wishing you happy reading.

GB Banjara
General Manager
## List of Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Name in full</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After-Action Review</td>
<td>A systematic process for the capturing of experiences and learning jointly with team members and implementation partners after the activity has been completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIUB</td>
<td>American International University-Bangladesh</td>
<td>Private university known for its business education programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATC-P</td>
<td>Agribusiness for Trade Competitiveness Project</td>
<td>Katalyst’s local name during Phase 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>BARI</td>
<td>Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute</td>
<td>Bangladesh’s main public agricultural research body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAU</td>
<td>Bangladesh Agriculture University</td>
<td>Public agricultural university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDT</td>
<td>Bangladeshi taka</td>
<td>Official currency of Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Business Promotion Council</td>
<td>Public sector body hosted within the Ministry of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSMRAU</td>
<td>Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Agricultural University</td>
<td>Public agricultural university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
<td>Canadian government’s official development assistance body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoP</td>
<td>Community of Practice</td>
<td>Group of practitioners applying (semi-)structured processes and methods for experience-sharing and learning related to a mutual area of interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
<td>Form of organisation which is not part of the public or private sector system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAE</td>
<td>Department of Agricultural Extension</td>
<td>Main extension service in Bangladesh under the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
<td>Denmark’s public international development arm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCED</td>
<td>Donor Committee for Enterprise Development</td>
<td>Multi-donor funded forum for learning about the most effective ways to create economic opportunities for the poor based on practical experience in private sector development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
<td>UK government’s official development assistance body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKN</td>
<td>The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands</td>
<td>Official development assistance body of the government of the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYP</td>
<td>Five-Year Plan</td>
<td>Prepared by Planning Commission of the Bangladesh government</td>
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</table>
How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh

### Abbreviation | Name in full | Explanation
--- | --- | ---
KIB | Krishibid Institution Bangladesh | Membership organisation of agricultural professionals with around 12,000 members
M4P | Making Markets Work for the Poor | Approach aimed at facilitating change in market systems in order to improve access of poor people to markets as producers, workers and consumers
Mio | Million | N/A
MFI | Microfinance Institution | N/A
MRM | Monitoring and Results Measurement | Key project cycle management process tracking results for accountability, learning and steering purposes
MSD | Market Systems Development | A term increasingly replacing the earlier abbreviation M4P (see above)
MSME | Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises | Enterprises employing between 1 to 50 people
MTR | Mid-Term Review | Internal or external review process to assess progress of a development programme and to recommend adaptations
NAPD | National Academy for Planning and Development | Key public sector training academy for planning
BPATC | Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre | Key public sector training centre for civil administration
PKSF | Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation | Micro-finance apex body established by the Government of Bangladesh in 1990, registered as non-profit company
PPP | Public-Private Partnership | A cooperative arrangement between two or more public and private sectors, typically of a long-term nature
PPM | Project Preparation Mandate | Katalyst’s one-year bridging phase between phases 2 and 3
RDA | Rural Development Academy | Training academy under Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development & Cooperatives
SAAO | Sub Assistant Agricultural Officer | Field-based extension officials under Department of Agricultural Extension. Each official is responsible for serving 900-1200 rural households.
SAU | Sylhet Agricultural University | Public agricultural university
SDC | Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation | Swiss government’s main official development assistance body within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SBAU | Sher-e-Bangla Agricultural University | Public agricultural university
SIDA | Swedish International Development Agency | The Swedish government’s main official development assistance body
SME | Small and Medium Enterprises | See MSME, above
Katalyst comes to a close in March 2018 with an impressive track record. At the time of field work carried out for the study, the project has financially benefitted 4.7 million micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and contributed to a total farmer household income increase of USD 691 million. This was achieved through highly competent programme management, the high level of flexibility provided to Katalyst by its donors, and the cultivation and building up of a pool of several hundred competent and dynamic young Bangladeshi professionals who have been part of the Katalyst journey over the last 16 years.

Capitalising on these results, the donors for Phase 3, including the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), want to ensure that 'the Katalyst way of doing things' remains anchored within Bangladesh. In Phase 3 therefore, the project was mandated to focus specifically on the anchoring of its experiences and approaches within key Bangladeshi public and private institutions. While institutional anchoring has taken place in previous phases, throughout Phase 3 Katalyst has worked with 13 external anchoring institutions, to take on this mandate much more prominently under the term capitalisation.

This study intends to validate Katalyst's experiences of institutional anchoring. It critically analyses the process involved and assesses the extent to which Katalyst has achieved its envisioned impact; it draws lessons from both the process and the extent of the project’s success, and makes these lessons accessible to other practitioners. While at too early a stage to assess appropriately the impact of Katalyst’s anchoring interventions on partner institutions (let alone the beneficiaries), the study provides interesting insights into how such an anchoring mandate can be taken on as part of a market systems development (MSD) programme. The findings of this study were collected by means of a secondary literature review and a 10-day field trip to Bangladesh in September 2017, during which several key informants were interviewed.

The study found clear evidence that Katalyst has planted important seeds for change in a diverse range of anchoring institutions within Bangladesh. In academia, four partners from agricultural institutions (including the Rural Development Academy (RDA), Bogra and the American International University of Bangladesh (AIUB), Dhaka) have been influenced by the Katalyst experience to change their curricula, and improved their collaboration with the private sector in the development and the delivery of educational programmes. In the governmental sphere, Katalyst’s work with the Department of Agriculture Extension (DAE) triggered a revision of the main instruction manual for the 14,000 field extension officers; the project also built an accompanying training programme, enabling extension officers to deliver more inclusive services to the more than 16 million farmer households within their constituencies. At the same time however, it became evident that the ambitious nature of taking on an institutional anchoring mandate working with thirteen different partner organisations in the last phase of a development programme influences – and can compromise – the breadth, depth and sustainability of changes induced.

A variety of factors appear to have influenced the success of Katalyst’s institutional anchoring mandate.

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### Abbreviation Table

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ToC</td>
<td>Theory of Change</td>
<td>Model that explains changes expected to happened, from intervention to outputs, outcomes and impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ToT</td>
<td>Training of Trainers</td>
<td>Process of building capacity of trainers who in turn train course participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
<td>Official currency of the United States of America</td>
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A variety of factors appear to have influenced the success of Katalyst’s institutional anchoring
interventions. These include the wealth of results generated by the project (and through this, its establishment of a strong brand and credibility within Bangladesh), its personal contacts and connections, the timing of engagement with a partner, and the alignment with the partner’s core mandate. Also evident is the correlation between the duration of an engagement and the sustainability of change, indicating the importance of time in the process of institutional change. Finally, the chances for uptake and sustainability seem to increase strongly in those cases where an anchoring partner has been involved from the start in the generation of the experience and the transformation.

The authors view is that institutional anchoring work with reasonably direct feedback loops into the core MSD sector portfolio should be part of every MSD programme, as it strengthens the sustainability of results and overall systemic change. However, institutional change takes time, making it important to engage early on with institutional partners and increase ownership by involving them actively in the initial generation of the experience.

Whether or not engagement with anchoring institutions takes place beyond the core mandate of an MSD programme – in distant, interconnected market systems with somewhat indirect feedback loops into the core sector portfolio – is a political decision to be made at the donor level. As this case study argues, it may make more sense to design a separate programme which takes on a broader mandate of institutional change (for example, how to improve collaboration between universities and the private sector) with a sufficient resource envelope and staff profiles specifically tailored to the task.

If it is decided to add an external institutional anchoring mandate into an MSD programme, then it is important to acknowledge that it cannot be measured with the same yardstick, the quantitative indicators and impact logic, and value for money considerations. It also has the following implications:

a. It needs to be introduced early on and not in a last phase of a programme, as institutional change takes time.

b. It needs a broader intervention portfolio with the anchoring institution, which targets overall behavioural and institutional change.

c. It needs an additional skillset to that of a more classic MSD programme, including capacities related to political economy and institutional development.

Finally, exit comes at entry. The search for appropriate anchoring institutions for the knowledge, approaches and capacities to be generated in a MSD programme (or any development programme) must begin with programme implementation. This allows anchoring partners to be part of the process of the generation of experiences, to be integrated into the programme set-up and team, and to be part of an intensive journey of capacity building and learning. The authors believe that ideas such as these should be explored more extensively when designing new programmes, as they feed the core of the very mandate of any international development actor, equipping capable individuals and institutions with the ability to shape their own future in an inclusive manner – in other words, leaving a legacy.
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ABOUT THIS CASE STUDY
This chapter describes the main objectives of the study, sheds light on its methodology, clarifies terminology and explains its limits. At the same time, this study aims to provide lessons for other development organisations and practitioners active in the field of MSD. While the objectives of the study are to:

1. validate capitalisation in a market such as Katalyst can claim pioneer status, both at its inception and at its closing down of a long-running MSD programme, and when practiced by Katalyst and identify best practices
2. analyse critically the process of capitalisation discussing issues of institutional anchoring
3. assess the envisioned impact of capitalisation
4. generate lessons learned and recommendations for other development programmes and organisations carried out during a field visit in Bangladesh, 10-19 September 2017 (see Annex 2 for the list of participants).

The study focuses on the thirteen institutions targeted at the programme team, the implementing organisation Swisscontact, and the current project donors, including the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID).

1.1 Methodology

The last 16 years of Katalyst were funded by SDC, DFID, DANIDA, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN). While SDC and DFID have funded Katalyst throughout its full lifecycle, each of the other donors has co-funded the programme for one full phase.
This chapter describes the main objectives of the study, sheds light on its methodology, clarifies terminology and explains its limits.

The objectives of the study are to:

1. validate capitalisation in a market development programme such as Katalyst
2. analyse critically the process of capitalisation practiced by Katalyst and identify best practices
3. assess the envisioned impact of capitalisation on anchoring organisations
4. generate lessons learned and recommendations for other development programmes and organisations

While these objectives contain aspects of an evaluation, the study is not intended to evaluate but rather to focus on learning. Like capitalisation at its very core, this study is future-oriented, in that it analyses experiences from the past to learn from what did and did not work. It is first and foremost targeted at the programme team, the implementing organisation Swisscontact, and the current project donors, including the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)². At the same time, this study aims to provide lessons for other development organisations and practitioners active in the field of MSD. While MSD programmes have ‘mushroomed’ throughout the developing world since 2010, Katalyst can claim pioneer status, both at its inception and at its closing down of a long-running MSD programme, and when discussing issues of institutional anchoring.

1.1 Methodology

The methodology applied in this study has been mainly explorative using qualitative instruments. Data collection took place through a review of secondary literature and key informant interviews carried out during a field visit in Bangladesh, 10-19 September 2017 (see Annex 2 for the list of participants).

The study focuses on the thirteen institutions selected by Katalyst with which to anchor its experiences. Eight institutions were interviewed directly; information about the remaining five was collected from various Katalyst team members and triangulated. Two of the funding donors were also interviewed to anchor the study within the context of the donor mandate.

² The last 16 years of Katalyst were funded by SDC, DFID, DANIDA, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN). While SDC and DFID have funded Katalyst throughout its full lifecycle, each of the other donors has co-funded the programme for one full phase.
All thirteen institutions were assessed according to a pre-defined format (see Annex 1). This lists why a particular institution was selected, the interventions carried out, the roles of Katalyst and the institution, what the expected theory of change looked like, any evidence for change (and the significance and sustainability of this change), and finally what can be learned from the experience.

The authors also took care not only to examine cases that the Katalyst team considers more successful but also those where the programme has struggled. Again, this follows the spirit of maximising the learning experience.

1.2 Limitations of this case study

The study has the following important limitations:

1. **Methodology.** The study is not based on independent research (which generates hard evidence) but on information obtained from the programme team and its partners, making it in many ways subjective.

2. **Terminology.** Although Katalyst uses the term ‘capitalisation’ internally to refer to its external anchoring work, in the development field this is generally understood in a broader sense to include both internal and external learning processes. For the purpose of this study, capitalisation is to be understood as external institutional anchoring, unless stated otherwise.

3. **Timing.** The study was carried out while many of the institutional anchoring interventions were still being implemented, making it difficult to assess results and their sustainability over time. It thus provides impressions based on early evidence.

Nevertheless, the authors are convinced that the learnings provided in this case study will prove insightful for the Katalyst team, its donors, and the wider development community dealing with similar challenges.
All thirteen institutions were assessed according to a pre-defined format (see Annex 1). This lists why a capitalisation internally refers to its external particular institution was selected, the interventions anchoring work, in the development field this is carried out, the roles of Katalyst and the institution, generally understood in a broader sense to what the expected theory of change looked like, any include both internal and external learning evidence for change (and the significance and processes. For the purpose of this study, sustainability of this change), and finally what can be capitalisation is to be understood as external learned from the experience. Institutional anchoring, unless stated otherwise.

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The initial rationale for the strong focus on by one year, from April 2017 until March 2018. The institutional anchoring in Phase 3 is best understood by looking at the overall lifecycle of the programme. Katalyst approach throughout its lifetime.

Katalyst, operating under different local programme names, began in 2002 with Phase 1. Its third and final pioneer programme in the field of M4P/MSD and at phase ended in March 2017. The transition from the forefront of ... that this approach can decision among the donors to extend the last phase achieve results at large scale and bring about

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<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Main focus</th>
<th>Prove points</th>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Funding (in CHF)</th>
<th>Professional staff</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1:</td>
<td>2002-2008</td>
<td>15 sectors</td>
<td>Innovating, piloting</td>
<td>Prove that the M4P approach works</td>
<td>32.6 Mio</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8 Mio SMEs</td>
<td>USD 140 Mio</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2:</td>
<td>2008-2013</td>
<td>8 core sectors, 8 cross sectors</td>
<td>Scale and systemic change</td>
<td>Prove that the M4P approach can achieve attribute results at scale</td>
<td>50.6 Mio</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.37 Mio SMEs</td>
<td>USD 295 Mio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3:</td>
<td>2013-2018</td>
<td>3 core sectors, 3 cross sectors</td>
<td>Systematic change and institutional anchoring</td>
<td>Ensure that the inclusive MSD capacities of Katalyst remain within Bangladesh</td>
<td>32 Mio</td>
<td>53 [extension]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(including PPM+Extension)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.62 Mio SMEs</td>
<td>USD 256 Mio</td>
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</tr>
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* till September 2017

Figure 1: Katalyst programme throughout its lifecycle

3 Today, the term MSD is increasingly replacing the term 'Making Markets Work for the Poor' (M4P) and is therefore used throughout this document.

Leaving a Legacy

How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh - A Case Study
The initial rationale for the strong focus on institutional anchoring in Phase 3 is best understood by looking at the overall lifecycle of the programme. Katalyst, operating under different local programme names, began in 2002 with Phase 1. Its third and final phase ended in March 2017. The transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 included a 12-month Project Preparation Mandate (PPM) phase which slowed down implementation on the ground. This led to the decision among the donors to extend the last phase by one year, from April 2017 until March 2018. The table below selects key characteristics to outline the Katalyst approach throughout its lifetime.

Throughout phases 1 and 2 (2002-13), Katalyst was a pioneer programme in the field of M4P/MSD³ and at the forefront of knowledge generation. Phase 1 was about innovation and proving that leveraging funds and commitment from the private sector works. Phase 2 focused on proving that this approach can achieve results at large scale and bring about

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<td>Prove that the M4P approach can achieve attribute results at scale</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding (in CHF)</td>
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<td>50.6 Mio DFID, SDC, CIDA</td>
<td>32 Mio DFID, SDC, DANIDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional staff</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>53→20 (extension)</td>
</tr>
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Figure 1: Katalyst programme throughout its lifecycle

³ Today, the term MSD is increasingly replacing the term ‘Making Markets Work for the Poor’ (M4P) and is therefore used throughout this document.
systemic changes in a sustainable manner. This also brought heavy investments into rigorous monitoring and results measurement (MRM). In this regard, Katalyst has contributed substantially to the development of the global standard for results measurement developed by the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED).

In preparation for the Phase 2 mid-term review (MTR) the donor management board discussed options for the programme’s future, tasking the MTR team to look into options ranging from the ‘privatisation’ of Katalyst as an own consulting firm, to an additional Phase 3, or the closing of the programme at the end of Phase 2. The starting point for these discussions was a realisation that Katalyst has generated a huge wealth of valuable experiences and human resource capacities over its lifetime. The donors wanted to ensure that the ‘Katalyst way of doing things’ remains within Bangladesh, in order to have:

a. more development programmes which are designed and managed based on Katalyst learning and experiences (target group = development partners and practitioners)
b. more sustainable systemic changes within the Katalyst programme’s core sectors (target group = public and private stakeholders in core sectors)
c. a better anchoring of experiences, methods and capacities within Bangladeshi institutions (target group = think tanks, academia, public sector institutions, research firms)

The Phase 2 MTR recommended that these goals would be best reached by an additional programme phase which would have a strong focus on external institutional anchoring. This led to the Phase 3 Theory of Change (ToC) (Figure 2) which had two parallel streams, focusing on 1) the core MSD mandate of strengthening selected core market systems, and 2) institutional anchoring initiatives. The change logic implies that over time, results from the institutional anchoring work will generate reinforcing feedback loops and leverage results in core sectors.

This ToC was translated into the programme’s logical framework (logframe), defining deliverables and the programme approach to the topic of institutional anchoring. It also gave structure to the way Katalyst was set up internally and how it communicated results outside the development sector.
Leaving a Legacy
How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh - A Case Study

Outcome 1
Sustainable and inclusive systematic changes are taking place in selected sectors

Impact
Poverty Reduced in Bangladesh

Outcome 1
Value adding business services and/or demand stimulating activities for farms and MSMEs identifies and successfully promoted

Technical assistance to text and introduce innovations targeting poor market actors

Technical assistance to trigger/reinforce/stimulate market reactions to the innovators

Partnership grants along with documented knowledge and experience are offered to businesses, business membership organisations, think tanks, universities, consultants and research organisations

Generate, capture, refine and document Katalyst’s approach, knowledge and experience

Reinforcing feedback loops

Figure 2: Katalyst Phase 3 Theory of Change
THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL ANCHORING IN KATALYST
3 THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL ANCHORING IN KATALYST
This chapter examines the process of institutional anchoring as practiced in Katalyst and analyses its key steps. As the process is very much influenced by Katalyst's overall management set-up, it starts by looking at how the programme as a whole was organised with regard to institutional anchoring (4.1). It then analyses the process of institutional anchoring comprising the team members' activities across these three phases. In addition, each core sector team organised regular sector team meetings to discuss its sector strategy and monitor progress; a member of the capitalisation team attended these meetings. The core sector portfolio, knowledge management and capitalisation team was further involved in the two main knowledge capturing processes practiced in Katalyst: after-action reviews (AARs) and communities of practice (CoP). Over time, this practice of working in flexible teams throughout the programme's units and teams. Capitalisation team members attended both sustainability and administration and finance main knowledge capturing processes practiced in Katalyst's MRM and communication units. Throughout the programme's lifetime of its three phases, Katalyst developed a very strong sharing and learning culture. Phase 3 started with three main structural pillars: the core sector portfolio, knowledge management and capitalisation, and administration and finance. Institutional anchoring/ capitalisation was set up having transversal character, similar to Katalyst's MRM and communication units. Over time, this practice of working in flexible teams structurally in parallel to the core sector portfolio.
This chapter examines the process of institutional anchoring as practiced in Katalyst and analyses its key steps. As the process is very much influenced by Katalyst’s overall management set-up, it starts by looking at how the programme as a whole was organised with regard to institutional anchoring (4.1).

It then analyses the process of institutional anchoring, focusing particularly on the capturing of experiences and partner selection (4.2), as well as the concrete interventions carried out with anchoring partners (4.3). This delivers the basis for Chapter 5, which assesses the evidence for change and sustainability.

3.1 Programme set-up and management in support of institutional anchoring

Phase 3 started with three main structural pillars: the core sector portfolio, knowledge management and capitalisation, and administration and finance (Figure 3). As a function, institutional anchoring/capitalisation was set up having transversal character, similar to Katalyst’s MRM and communication units. Throughout the phase, with an increasing focus on institutional anchoring and the related intervention portfolio becoming much clearer, it developed increasingly into an own intervention pillar, structurally in parallel to the core sector portfolio.

Underpinning the organisational structure, Katalyst established a set of internal management processes which structured collaboration between the programme’s units and teams. Across these, over the lifetime of its three phases Katalyst developed a very strong sharing and learning culture. Phase 3 operated with a flat hierarchy and a core leadership team (CLT), comprising the team leader and all unit heads as the main management vehicle (around six people). A weekly CLT meeting discussed key strategic and operational issues, and every alternate week included additional core team members (around 15 people). Capitalisation team members attended both of these meetings and aligned the institutional anchoring mandate with the overall programme strategy. In addition, each core sector team organised regular sector team meetings to discuss its sector strategy and monitor progress; a member of the capitalisation team attended these meetings. The capitalisation team was further involved in the two main knowledge capturing processes practiced in Katalyst: after-action reviews (AARs) and communities of practice (CoP).

Over time, this practice of working in flexible teams across organisational units led to a sharpening of the institutional anchoring mandate, resulting in the current intervention portfolio containing thirteen partner institutions.
The actual institutional anchoring process of Katalyst - knowledge capturing to identify experiences is best split into three phases: preparation, implementation, and change adoption (Figure 5). In positively to overall systemic change and scale the preparation phase, Katalyst developed a knowledge audit, creating a capitalisation strategy which clarified the internal identification of partners including an assessment understanding of capitalisation as a whole and how of needs and demands for specific experiences external institutional anchoring fits into it. (knowledge audit), leading to the selection of anchoring partners.

The implementation phase comprised the following anchoring partners:

- General Manager
- Taskforces
- Head External Relations
- Division Manager Knowledge & Capitalisation
- Manager Women Economic Empowerment
- Head Local Agribusiness-Networks, Capitalisation, Innovation Fund Management
- Head Communication
- Head Monitoring and Results Measurement
- Institutional Development
- Division Manager Sector portfolio
- Manager Vegetable Sector Key Topic Seed
- Manager Farmed Fish Sector Key Topic Marketing
- Manager Maize Sector Key Topic Fertiliser Inputs
- Manager Information Channels
- Division Manager Finance, IT & Administration
- Deputy Division Manager Finance
- Head Information Technology
- Head Administration
- Head Monitoring and Results Measurement
- Manager Information Channels

**Figure 3:** Katalyst organogram at the beginning of Phase 3

**Figure 4:** Main knowledge capturing tools applied in Katalyst Phase 3

**Figure 5:** Institutional Anchoring Process in Katalyst Phase 3
The actual institutional anchoring process of Katalyst - knowledge capturing to identify experiences is best split into three phases: preparation, which appeared to have potential to contribute implementation, and change adoption (Figure 5). In positively to overall systemic change and scale the preparation phase, Katalyst developed a using AARs and COPs capitalisation strategy which clarified the internal identification of partners including an assessment understanding of capitalisation as a whole and how of needs and demands for specific experiences external institutional anchoring fits into it. (knowledge audit), leading to the selection of anchoring partners.

The implementation phase comprised the following anchoring partners:

- General Manager
- Taskforces
- Head External Relations
- Division Manager
- Knowledge & Capitalisation Manager Women
- Economic Empowerment Manager
- Farmed Fish Sector
- Key Topic Marketing Head
- Head Communication Manager
- Maize Sector
- Key Topic Fertiliser Inputs
- Head Administration
- Head Monitoring and Results Measurement
- Information Channels
- Institutional Development
- Head Information Technology
- Head Local Agribusiness-Networks, Capitalisation, Innovation Fund Management
- Vegetable Sector
- Deputy Division Manager Finance
- Division Manager Sector protfolio
- Division Manager Finance, IT & Administration
- Knowledge transfer
- Knowledge Codification
- Partner Selection & Knowledge Audit
- List of 27 experiences and practices
- List of 28 potential Institutions
- Interventions with 13 Institutions
- Knowledge Capturing
- Katalyst Capitalisation Strategy

Figure 4: Main knowledge capturing tools applied in Katalyst Phase 3

The actual institutional anchoring process of Katalyst is best split into three phases: preparation, implementation, and change adoption (Figure 5). In the preparation phase, Katalyst developed a capitalisation strategy which clarified the internal understanding of capitalisation as a whole and how external institutional anchoring fits into it.

The implementation phase comprised the following four key steps:

- **knowledge capturing** to identify experiences which appeared to have potential to contribute positively to overall systemic change and scale using AARs and COPs
- **identification of partners** including an assessment of needs and demands for specific experiences (knowledge audit), leading to the selection of anchoring partners

Figure 5: Institutional Anchoring Process in Katalyst Phase 3
- **knowledge codification**, that is, the packaging of the captured experiences into a form most useful for the selected partners
- **knowledge transfer** including the process of transferring knowledge from the project to the partner

Several targeted support interventions were then utilised to make sure that experiences and knowledge were appropriately adopted and adapted and, wherever possible, used for scaling up. Regular MRM interventions supported the whole process throughout Phase 3 and led to adaptations along the way.

This study does not discuss each step in detail; these often overlap and are iterative in practice. The following chapters focus on the aspects of experience capturing and partner selection, and the interventions carried out with the anchoring partners.

### 3.2 Capturing experiences and partner selection

The institutional anchoring process started with the team conducting an intensive process of experience collection from phase 2 and 3 sector work. The programme’s established learning culture, along with established instruments and processes for knowledge capturing, made this process highly efficient, as much of the knowledge was already documented. The role of the MRM team was crucial, as experiences were qualified according to their success rate in terms of outreach and systemic change. For each experience, a tangible output (e.g., manual, training module) and potential target audiences were identified and listed. Most of these experiences related to technical issues addressing specific sector constraints. At the same time, the Katalyst team conducted several events with other development practitioners in order to identify innovative experiences for more inclusive business development in Bangladesh. These experiences related less to a specific sector constraint and focused rather on generic practices, such as last-mile service delivery, public-private partnerships, and women in agriculture. This process led to the compilation of 27 experiences and practices which Katalyst considered as having potential for anchoring within Bangladeshi institutions.

Based on this list of experiences, Katalyst then commissioned a Bangladesh research firm to carry out a detailed knowledge audit process for 28 potential anchoring partners, identified jointly by Katalyst and the research firm.

The following criteria were used to assess the different institutions:

- **Influence**: the level of influence the partner has over key stakeholders in the area of inclusive business in Bangladesh
- **Incentives**: incentives of a partner to take on experiences into core work portfolio
- **Capability**: capacities of a partner to absorb and implement Katalyst experiences
- **Reach**: potential outreach to service providers offering services to farmers
- **Collaboration**: openness to collaboration with Katalyst

Each partner was given a first, second or third priority ranking, based on which the programme began to engage with them more intensively. This resulted in i) some organisations being dropped due to limited buy-in, ii) a revisiting of the list of experiences, and iii) a repackaging of the experiences according to the needs of interested partners.

The programme ended up working with 13 anchoring institutions, including:

- **Four agricultural universities**. Bangladesh Agricultural University (Mymensingh), Sylhet Agricultural University, Sher-e-Bangla Agricultural University (Dhaka) and Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib Agricultural University (Gazipur).

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4. A knowledge audit is designed to check (through literature review and the use of questionnaires, discussion events, FGDs and other standard tools) what types of knowledge and experience are demanded and needed by the targeted organisations.
• **One private business university.** American International University of Bangladesh (AIUB) (Dhaka).

• **Two public sector training providers.** The Rural Development Academy (RDA) (Bogra) (offering training for professionals in rural development) and the National Academy for Planning and Development (NAPD) (Dhaka) (responsible for the training of public sector officials).

• **Three public sector service providers.** The Business Promotion Council (BPC) (under the Ministry of Commerce responsible for export promotion), the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute (BARI) (Bangladesh’s main public sector research body in the field of agriculture) and the Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) (under the Ministry of Agriculture, the main public service provider to farmers throughout Bangladesh).

• **One private service provider.** Nielsen (the largest private company in Bangladesh offering market research services).

• **One private foundation.** Krishibid Institution Bangladesh (the largest membership organisation for agriculture professionals in Bangladesh).

• **One non-profit company.** Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) (a key umbrella institution for several hundred micro-finance institutions in Bangladesh).

Figure 6 depicts the different public and private sector actors in reference to their sphere of influence, ranging from influence on the agricultural system to that on the broader rural economy and the economy in general (see List of Abbreviations for full name of each organisation).

Several partners initially given a high priority ranking (such as the Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (PATC), the University of Dhaka, and BRAC) did not end up as intervention partners. The main reasons for this were lack of interest on the institution’s part, a lack of capacity for engagement, or difficulty for Katalyst to find the right entry point.

### 3.3 Anchoring interventions with partners

After identifying an interest in collaborating on the part of the thirteen partners (and the potential for such a collaboration to work), a tailor-made intervention package was defined for each. Figure 7 illustrates Katalyst’s portfolio of anchoring interventions during Phase 3. Some of these began in 2014; the majority started in 2015 and 2016, with most of them still being implemented at the time of this study.

With the exception of those interventions conducted with BARI, BPC and PKSF (where the focus was on a specific business practice identified from core sector
work, such as summer maize promotion, contract farming, profitable vegetable cropping patterns), interventions had a broader focus on inclusive business practices or improved collaboration between the public and private sectors. Common to all Katalyst interventions was the aim of institutional change. It is useful to classify the interventions according to the aspect of institutional change they target. Three broad categories emerge:

i) interventions targeting changes in key documentation of an institution

ii) interventions targeting institutional practices and processes

### Figure 7: Interventions carried out with each anchoring partner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring partner</th>
<th>Interventions carried out with anchoring partner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Agricultural universities | • Organisation of job fairs involving private sector and universities  
• Revision of curricula at undergraduate level in collaboration with the private sector, integrating Katalyst experiences into course reference material |
| RDA | • Revision of post-graduate diploma course for rural development integrating Katalyst experiences into course modules |
| NAPD | • Development of a post-graduate diploma course in development planning |
| DAE | • Revision of DAE’s key instruction manual for extension services, integrating key topics such as public-private partnerships, gender equality and climate change |
| KIB | • Organisation of job fairs involving agriculture-related private sector partners and major Bangladesh agricultural institutions  
• Organisation of an annual Krishi award in the presence of the President of Bangladesh, integrating key categories such as inclusive business and gender equality in agriculture |
| BARI | • Publishing of guideline for summer maize |
| BPC | • Publishing of guideline for contract farming for perishable, export-oriented products (e.g. fish, fruits and vegetables)  
• Increasing BPC’s institutional strength and improving business planning capacity |
| AIUB | • Development of two undergraduate courses (product innovation, rural product marketing) in collaboration with private sector |
| PKSF | • ToT of the agriculture unit at PKSF head office for national rollout of pilot experience (delivery of non-financial services) |
| Nielsen | • Development of capacities for qualitative research in the field of agriculture |

### Figure 8: Aspects of institutional change targeted through anchoring interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring partner</th>
<th>Targeting key document</th>
<th>Targeting institutional practice and process</th>
<th>Targeting institutional capacities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural universities</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPD</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAE</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIB</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARI</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIUB</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKSF</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nielsen</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
iii) interventions targeting capacities of people within an institution

Figure 8 shows that most institutional anchoring interventions targeted specific documents, (such as a curriculum, manual or course material), often in combination with the process leading to the development of those documents (such as the involvement of the private sector for curriculum development).

With only a few partners did Katalyst intervene at the level of institutional capacity. As this study shows, this correlates with the evidence and sustainability of changes. None of the interventions were aimed at more complex institutional aspects, such as management and leadership capacities, as this was considered beyond the programme’s institutional anchoring mandate.
4 EVIDENCE FOR CHANGE AND SUSTAINABILITY
This chapter examines: 1) the evidence for change, and a high likelihood of sustainability of changes, ii) and 2) the sustainability of changes of intervention the case of agriculture academia, providing results carried out as part of Katalyst's institutional example of medium evidence for change and anchoring efforts, with reference to three specific medium likelihood of sustainability, and iii) BARI, cases (see Annex 1 for detailed discussion of the representing a case with currently limited evidence for change and a low likelihood of sustainability.

The following graph (Figure 9, below) plots the thirteen partner institutions against the criteria of 'evidence for change' and 'likelihood for sustainability of change'. Evidence for change relates to whether there are clear indications that anchoring institutions have taken up experiences and are starting to do things differently. 'Sustainability of change' is understood as the likelihood for changes to last over time after Katalyst programme interventions have stopped.

The graph indicates a somewhat wide spectrum of observed changes and likelihood for sustainability of change. It must be remembered that the DAE case is a good example of Katalyst's ability to capitalise on opportunity when it occurs at the right complexity, making results difficult to foresee at the beginning of an engagement; nevertheless, certain patterns emerge. Three cases are presented here to initiate had close prior engagement with Katalyst in his previous capacity as programme manager for the DAE experience, illustrating strong evidence for change.
This chapter examines 1) the evidence for change, and 2) the sustainability of changes of intervention results carried out as part of Katalyst’s institutional anchoring efforts, with reference to three specific cases (see Annex 1 for detailed discussion of the changes observed for all thirteen institutions). The following graph (Figure 9, below) plots the thirteen partner institutions against the criteria of ‘evidence for change’ and ‘likelihood for sustainability of change’. Evidence for change relates to whether there are clear indications that anchoring institutions have taken up experiences and are starting to do things differently. ‘Sustainability of change’ is understood as the likelihood for changes to last over time after Katalyst programme interventions have stopped.

The graph indicates a somewhat wide spectrum of observed changes and likelihood for sustainability of change. It must be remembered that each case is specific in terms of its context and complexity, making results difficult to foresee at the beginning of an engagement; nevertheless, certain patterns emerge. Three cases are presented here to provide a flavour of the spectrum of results: i) the DAE experience, illustrating strong evidence for change and a high likelihood of sustainability of changes, ii) the case of agriculture academia, providing an example of medium evidence for change and medium likelihood of sustainability, and iii) BARI, representing a case with currently limited evidence for change and a low likelihood of sustainability.

**Figure 9: Observed evidence for change and likelihood of sustainability of change**

The DAE case is a good example of Katalyst’s ability to capitalise on opportunity when it occurs at the right time and using the right entry point. The Director General (DG) of DAE at the time of the anchoring initiative had close prior engagement with Katalyst in his previous capacity as programme manager for
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interventions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Revision of the DAE extension manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ToT cascading programme based on DAE extension manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expected change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Through the integration of more inclusive business practices into the DAE manual and the training of agriculture extension officers (SAAOs) based on the manual, service delivery to farmers improves contributing to improved farmer livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence for change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• DAE manual has been revised, printed and distributed throughout the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ToT programme has been implemented up to district level with 160 district officials trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ToT recipients started to teach SAAOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Significance of change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manual was revised for the first time in 15 years, with an accompanying ToT programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manual contains a broad range of topics far beyond Katalyst’s core mandate; the programme integrated key topics such as PPPs, climate-sensitive agriculture and gender equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Impacts at farmer level cannot reasonably be assessed or plausibly attributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability of change</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Manual will remain the main reference document for DAE officials in the near future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key steps of the revision process are likely to be replicated, as capacities for this have been built among DAE head office management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ToT process is likely to be sustained, as ToT capacities have been institutionalised with 10 DAE master instructors trained at head office level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Earlier direct intervention at DAE field level increases chances for sustainability, as the staff taking on the change co-own the experience made</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 10:** Case: Department of Agricultural Extension

Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation (HSI), which served as sub-contractor for a Katalyst intervention, bringing together trader associations with DAE extension services. Personal experience thus convinced the DG that Katalyst’s way of working makes sense and he opened his doors to the Katalyst team. The project’s knowledge audit process indicated that the key reference document for the 14,000 DAE extension officers at field level was an outdated manual which had ceased to reflect current agricultural practices. Katalyst convinced DAE to revise the material and to integrate new thematic areas, such as public-private partnerships for agricultural extension, use of media and ICT for agricultural extension, women’s participation in agriculture, and food safety and security in agriculture. By revising the manual to

![Figure 11: DAE manual training cascade](image-url)
focus on inclusive business practices and establishing a training of trainers (ToT) programme (cascading from 10 master trainers down to the 14,000 extension officers which jointly reach out to more than 16 million farmer households), Katalyst found an important leverage point close to DAE’s core mandate.

While Katalyst provided process management support, technical expertise and financial support, DAE put in a considerable amount of time and human resources to anchor the process within the department.

Entry into agricultural academia proved challenging, due to i) limited prior connections, and ii) the gap in institutional culture between young, business-minded Katalyst team members and more senior, academic and public sector-oriented academia. It was important to buy into networks and connections via key consultants having good access to the universities. Katalyst’s work with agricultural academia focused mainly on key documents and the process of elaborating these documents in collaboration with the industry; limited investments were possible into teacher capacities or overall institutional reform. The mere fact that universities were encouraged to review curricula in collaboration with Katalyst should be considered a success, as this

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Agricultural academia ¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Interventions | • Revision of undergraduate curricula in agribusiness-related courses, with a focus on inclusive market development, and integrating Katalyst cases and Bangladesh reference material  
• Facilitation of improved collaboration between industries through curriculum development and the organisation of job fairs |
| Expected change | • Through an improved industry (obtained via university collaboration and a curriculum better adapted to workplace needs) university graduates become more employable, find positions in public and private service delivery organisations and ultimately provide better services to farmers |
| Evidence for change | • Some universities have revised the curriculum; none have yet taught based on it  
• Faculty members directly involved in anchoring interventions express a clear interest to maintain a closer collaboration with industry |
| Significance of change | • The results chain (from training university students at undergraduate level to actual change in behaviour which reaches farmer households) is very long, impossible to track and attribute  
• Actual influence of Katalyst on curriculum content is limited (10%-20%)  
• Improved industry practice. University collaboration is significant and first signs of this are visible (e.g. improved internship programmes); however, this can only be properly assessed when programme support ends and the practice continues independently |
| Sustainability of change | • Questionable whether the limited time of collaboration between Katalyst and the universities will lead to sustainably changed practices, particularly as limited investment at the level of overall institutional capacity was possible  
• Absence of an established process for regular curriculum revision in agricultural academia may pose a risk for the maintenance of university-industry exchange beyond withdrawal of programme support |

5 ‘Agricultural academia’ is presented as a single case in this document. Although the experiences and levels of change differed between the four universities, Katalyst’s interventions with each were similar and the overall lessons learned make sense for all of them. They are therefore presented as one case.

Figure 12: Case: Agricultural Academia
does not happen easily and only after a considerable amount of time and trust building. The BARI experience emerged from Katalyst’s core maize sector work and was aimed at improving the overall enabling environment for summer maize. As with the agriculture academia example, Katalyst’s prior engagement with BARI was limited and institutional cultures between Katalyst and BARI far apart. A major challenge was that the summer maize guideline was not immediately perceived by BARI as being close to its overall core mandate, lowering incentives to engage. This introduced the need to collaborate with various departments within BARI, contrary to the Institute’s established work culture which is very much organised according to structural units. The authors believe that with more facilitation support and time, it may have been possible to increase the significance and sustainability of change in the BARI case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute (BARI)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence for change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability of change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13: Case: BARI
does not happen easily and only after a considerable amount of time and trust building. This introduced the need to collaborate with various departments within BARI. The BARI experience emerged from Katalyst’s core contrary to the institutional cultures between Katalyst and BARI far apart. A major challenge was that the summer maize guideline was not immediately perceived by BARI as significant.

**Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected change</th>
<th>Evidence for change</th>
<th>Significance of change</th>
<th>Sustainability of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of a guideline for summer maize</td>
<td>By establishing and publishing a guideline for summer maize through BARI, private sector companies and extension services will increase the promotion of summer maize resulting in farmers growing it more successfully and improving their incomes</td>
<td>BARI has agreed to collaborate with Katalyst</td>
<td>The potential for change is quite significant. It would result in the promotion of a crop which has been neglected in Bangladesh and which would increase diversification of farmer income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Likelihood for sustainability of change is low. Programme support ends within six months of collaboration starting, and without further facilitation support the chance that BARI will continue working across organisational units to implement the guideline is limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13: Case: BARI Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute (BARI)
Without doubt, Katalyst has planted important seeds for change in a range of anchoring institutions within Bangladesh. While not all of these seeds will come to maturity, many others will have considerable impact.

The external visitor to Katalyst is struck by the wealth ensuring that the programme leaves a strong legacy of intellectual and human capital available. To echo beyond the 4.71 Million MSMEs and the USD 691 million household income increase already on its way. Katalyst is an ‘impressive project, with an impressive calling card. It is also clear that Katalyst Phase 3 has achieved much more in terms of external institutional anchoring than reflected upon in this study. An interesting external anchoring ‘by-product’ of the programme are the many staff members nurtured within Katalyst who have left to take on assignments in the private sector or with development partners capacity, as well as the donors’ flexibility. At the beginning of Phase 3, institutional anchoring was not reported by the project, as it could be perceived as a negative from a programme management point of view. From a broader development perspective, however, the positive impacts of this collaboration with different teams. As the mandate became clearer, and anchoring partners were identified and support interventions defined, this study can achieve. At the time of writing, a total of 65 former Katalyst staff members continue to work within Bangladesh, jointly managing around 3,000 MSMEs sector portfolio. Of fundamental importance is the management culture and the authors are convinced that it was the established learning processes and practices that made institutional anchoring work.

The programme has conducted AARs, worked in CoPs and documented experiences from inception, all of which have contributed to the legacy of the programme!
5 LESSONS LEARNED

Without doubt, Katalyst has planted important seeds for change in a range of anchoring institutions within Bangladesh. While not all of these seeds will come to maturity, many others will have considerable impact, ensuring that the programme leaves a strong legacy beyond the 4.71 Million MSMEs and the USD 691 million household income increase already on its calling card.

It is also clear that Katalyst Phase 3 has achieved much more in terms of external institutional anchoring than reflected upon in this study. An interesting external anchoring ‘by-product’ of the programme are the many staff members nurtured within Katalyst who have left to take on assignments in the private sector or with development partner institutions within Bangladesh. This is scarcely reported by the project, as it could be perceived as a negative from a programme management point of view. From a broader development perspective however, the positive impacts of this for overall development and more inclusive business practices in Bangladesh are likely to extend far beyond what the anchoring interventions discussed as part of this study can achieve. At the time of writing, a total of 65 former Katalyst staff members continue to work within Bangladesh, jointly managing around 3,000 staff members, taking decisions which influence tens of thousands of people. An impressive contribution to the legacy of the programme!

5.1 Lessons related to internal management of institutional anchoring

The external visitor to Katalyst is struck by the wealth of intellectual and human capital available. To echo the words of the independent MTR team of Phase 2, Katalyst is an ‘impressive project, with an impressive team that is well managed’ (Phase 2 MTR report, p.8). Phase 3 is the same. Chapter 4.1 has explained how the management set-up for institutional anchoring and for the project as a whole has changed throughout the phase. While these changes have been influenced by several factors, at the same time they reflect the project’s adaptive management capacity, as well as the donors’ flexibility. At the beginning of Phase 3, institutional anchoring was not clearly defined. To host it institutionally within a transversal unit which included knowledge management, capitalisation and MRM made sense, as this allowed learning to emerge and to grow out of a collaboration with different teams. As the mandate became clearer, and anchoring partners were identified and support interventions defined, this developed into the managing of institutional anchoring as a separate unit parallel to the core sector portfolio. Of fundamental importance is the management culture and the authors are convinced that it was the established learning processes and practices that made institutional anchoring work. The programme has conducted AARs, worked in CoPs and documented experiences from inception, all of
which have contributed to the delivery of a sound fundament for its external institutional anchoring work.

What has also become clear is that institutional anchoring is very much dependent on people, that is, on the anchoring partner staff and those of the project. It needs staff profiles characterised by:

- networking and social skills
- a certain seniority and experience in core sectors in order to have the necessary credibility
- a good understanding of the institutional reality of the anchoring partners

While some of these skills may have to be brought in through consultants or sub-contracting partners, it is important that a programme has these capacities in-house.

It is also important to have enough people for the job. Institutional anchoring work is human-resource intensive and staff have to invest a considerable amount of time building trust and relationships. The authors believe that Katalyst’s set-up – three to five full-time staff members working with 13 institutional anchoring partners, and with about 9% of the total project budget of CHF 32 million spent on institutional anchoring interventions – was appropriate.

It is important to factor in that receiving financial support (as well as technical assistance) is likely to be a driving incentive for a partner to collaborate. Most are prepared to contribute only their time. The thorough partner assessment and knowledge audit process carried out by Katalyst proved an excellent means of ensuring that incentives went deeper than mere financial interests.

Finally, we return to the important lesson on terminology alluded to in section 2.2. Katalyst uses the term ‘capitalisation’ almost synonymously with ‘external institutional anchoring’. While there is sufficient clarity within the project team (the capitalisation strategy has greatly contributed to internal understanding) this is confusing for the community of practitioners, including donors and institutional anchoring partners, among whom Katalyst uses the term widely in external communication, implying they all have a common understanding of it. The impression this gives is that institutional anchoring is the only action the programme takes in terms of capitalisation (whereas in fact there is a strong established practice of internal capitalisation, which is very much part of the design of every core sector intervention). The authors would recommend that Katalyst refrain from using the term ‘capitalisation’ with outside stakeholders, but rather focus on a term that describes the actual purpose of the process, such as in the cases discussed here, ‘external institutional anchoring’.

5. 2 Lessons related to partner selection

Finding the right partners to work with is at the core of successful external institutional anchoring. The Katalyst experience shows that it is not always easy to foresee how a partnership will evolve over time, as partners operate within complex systems involving a range of factors which can enable or hinder change.

A decisive element in terms of whether a partner started engagement with Katalyst was finding the right entry point in terms of a contact person. Partners with whom the programme had an established relationship through prior engagement in core sector work (e.g. DAE) or those who were approached through an influential ‘door opener’ (e.g. KIB) were more likely to be interested in collaboration. In other cases, the lack of an appropriate entry point resulted in some partners being ranked as first priority after the scoping study but not being selected (e.g. BPATC). The authors believe that the Katalyst donors’ influence could have been leveraged better to gain access to certain key partners, as many of the donors have strong established relationships through work in other programmes.

In addition to the right contact person, timing matters. Approaching a potential anchoring partner at the right time with the right offer made a huge difference, for example in the case of DAE, which saw a need for the revision of its instruction manual but lacked the financial support to do so. A programme needs the necessary flexibility and opportunism, as well as context monitoring capacities to spot such opportunities. It makes sense to include others, such as local research firms, governance experts and/or the project donors, in regular context monitoring exercises.
These points relate strongly to the **importance of understanding institutional structures, processes and the overall political economy surrounding anchoring partners**. Without a proper understanding of how power is distributed, how decisions are made, and how change happens within anchoring institutions, it is difficult to design interventions which last over time. It is then the art of programme management to embed interventions within this political economy context and to align the project mandate with the institutional mandate. Where this is not possible or not strong enough, a partnership is unlikely to lead to success. The BARI experience is a case in point, where the anchoring experience was not strongly enough aligned to BARI’s core mandate, and needed a manner of intra-institutional collaboration which was too far from the established institutional culture.

Finally, it is important to shed light on anchoring partners and how they contribute to the results achievement of the programme as a whole. The ToC suggests that anchoring interventions should feed back into the work in the core sectors, ultimately contributing to sustainable and inclusive systemic changes in these sectors. The programme has established result chains for most interventions with anchoring partners, and it has become clear that for some partners (e.g. DAE, BPC, BARI, PKSF and KIB) there are **clear feedback loops back into the core sector** while for others (e.g. Agriculture Universities, AIUB, RDA, Nielsen) the **impact chains are very long and very indirect**, making it impossible to establish attributable causal relationships between intervention and end beneficiaries (see Figure 14).

![Figure 14: Institutional anchoring partners with more direct feedback loops (green)](image)

Another key lesson related to partner selection is that buy-in and **sustainability is higher when the anchoring institution is also the experience owner**. The cases of the DAE (with whom Katalyst worked throughout phases 2 and 3) and PKSF (where Katalyst first piloted non-financial services with seven MFIs before bringing the experience up to the national umbrella organisation) have proven to be among the most successful anchoring experiences. This is a very strong case for **involving potential future anchoring partners as early as possible in the generation of experiences** to create co-ownership.

Interestingly, the interventions with the former group of partners focused on issues which can be directly implemented by **decision-makers already in the workplace** (e.g. a new manual, new guideline), while interventions with the latter group focus on producing a future generation of decision-makers but over a considerable amount of time (see Figure 15). There is no doubt that there is a high need for building such capacities in Bangladesh; however, the authors question whether a programme like Katalyst should have taken on such a large task within a closing down phase, and would argue that if done at all it should be much earlier in a programme’s lifecycle, with a
different ToC and measured with different indicators of success.

**Figure 15:** Distance from decision-making in job market vs strength of feedback loop on core sector portfolio
different ToC and measured with different indicators of success.

DAE

PKSF

4

agricultural

universities

BARI

KIB

RDA

AIUB

NAPD

BPC

High

Low

Distance from decision-making in job market

Reinforcement of systemic change in core portfolio

Figure 15: Distance from decision-making in job market vs strength of feedback loop on core sector portfolio

Leaving a Legacy

How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh - A Case Study
RECOMMENDATIONS
A number of recommendations emerge from this study that outreach and income targets were on track and study. Firstly, the authors believe that commissioning the programme had generated additional experiences for the learning from experiences with which were interesting from an institutional anchoring perspective. Figure 16 illustrates this in a pool of available knowledge is currently limited, and qualitative manner and illustrates a rather late take-off for the institutional anchoring work. In addition, the quantitative targets set for the Katalyst Phase 3 had ambitious outreach and income aiming at assessing the depth and sustainability of institutional change and to work with fewer partners, but with a broader intervention portfolio.

As the institutional anchoring work did not directly contribute to those priority implementation, external institutional anchoring to during the first part of Phase 3, until it became clear...
A number of recommendations emerge from this study. Firstly, the authors believe that commissioning a study for the learning from experiences with institutional anchoring is highly commendable. The pool of available knowledge is currently limited, and Katalyst and its donors had little to learn from. The authors would like to invite other programmes to do the same and donors to incentivise this kind of knowledge exchange across programmes and countries.

One key learning for both programme donors and implementers relates to target setting and how it influences programme design and prioritisation. Katalyst Phase 3 had ambitious outreach and income targets at the beneficiary level. Reaching these targets was initially seen as first priority for the programme. As the institutional anchoring work did not directly contribute to those targets, it took lower priority during the first part of Phase 3, until it became clear that outreach and income targets were on track and the programme had generated additional experiences which were interesting from an institutional anchoring perspective. Figure 16 illustrates this in a qualitative manner and illustrates a rather late take-off for the institutional anchoring work.

In addition, the quantitative targets set for the institutional anchoring work drove anchoring interventions towards a philosophy of ‘the more partners the better’, rather than towards depth and significance of change with fewer partners. The authors therefore recommend to the donors and the programme to focus on a more qualitative approach aiming at assessing the depth and sustainability of institutional change and to work with fewer partners, but with a broader intervention portfolio.

At the conception of Phase 3 and throughout its implementation, external institutional anchoring to

<table>
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<tr>
<th>2013</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sectors Partners</td>
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<td>Bangladeshi National Institutions not directly linked to sector work</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Limited priority</td>
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<td>*** High priority</td>
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Figure 16: Change in overall institutional focus of Katalyst throughout phase 3
some extent has been treated like an additional mandate (see also ToC), attached to a programme which was seen as otherwise not doing such work, somewhat as an afterthought, with the end of the programme approaching and a perceived need to anchor experiences within Bangladesh. The authors are of the opinion that many interventions implemented under the institutional anchoring umbrella, in particular the ones with more direct feedback loops into the work in core sectors should be considered a natural part of a MSD programme, as these interventions strengthen sustainability of results and overall systemic change. It is important however to keep in mind that institutional change takes time and a specific skillset, in particular when engaging with public sector institutions. It is therefore important to engage early on with such institutional partners and involve them actively in the initial generation of the experience to increase ownership. At the same time, it is important to engage beyond selected documents and key processes, and to invest into people within the institution to ensure the legacy of an internal adaptive capacity to further develop the experiences.

Whether or not to engage with anchoring institutions which have rather indirect and disbursed feedback loops into the core portfolio (as they are located in more distant interconnected market systems) is in the end a political decision to be taken at donor level and as such cannot be generalised. It very much depends on the country context and the overall portfolio of a specific donor or the development community as a whole. If it is decided to invest into it, then it is important to acknowledge that it cannot be measured with the same yardstick, the same quantitative indicators and impact logic, and the same value for money considerations. Even more so than for those anchoring partners with more direct feedback loops, it needs to come much earlier and not as part of a last programme phase. If, on the other hand, development partners have the ability and resources to set up a fully-fledged programme to improve linkages between education and the world of work, (which is what the interventions with RDA, AIUB and the agricultural academia were mainly focused on), it would likely be more effective to leave such kind of interventions to a specialised programme, with the necessary skillset, intervention portfolio and resource frame.

Finally, to return to an interesting chain of thought rooted in core MSD wisdom alluded to earlier in this study: exit comes at entry. The search for appropriate anchoring institutions to enable the knowledge, approaches and capacities to be generated in a MSD programme – in fact, any development programme – can start right at the beginning of programme implementation. This would allow anchoring partners to be part of the process of the generation of experiences, to be integrated into the programme set-up and team, and to be part of an intensive journey of capacity building and learning. This may be possible with a national level think tank, with a university, or more specifically in the case of MRM with a research firm, such as Nielsen. The authors believe that such ideas should be much more explored when designing new programmes, as they are at the core of the very mandate of any international development actor: to leave capable people and institutions with the ability to adapt to change.
some extent has been treated like an additional quantitative indicators and impact logic, and the mandate (see also ToC), attached to a programme same value for money considerations. Even more so which was seen as otherwise not doing such work, than for those anchoring partners with more direct somewhat as an afterthought, with the end of the feedback loops, it needs to come much earlier and programme approaching and a perceived need to not as part of a last programme phase.

If, on the anchor experiences within Bangladesh. The authors other hand, development partners have the ability are of the opinion that many interventions and resources to set up a fully-fledged programme to implemented under the institutional anchoring improve linkages between education and the world umbrella, in particular the ones with more direct of work, (which is what the interventions with RDA, feedback loops into the work in core sectors should AIUB and the agricultural academia were mainly be considered a natural part of a MSD programme, as focused on), it would likely be more effective to leave these interventions strengthen sustainability of such kind of interventions to a specialised results and overall systemic change. It is important programme however to keep in mind that institutional change portfolio and resource frame. takes time and a specific skillset, in particular when Finally, to return to an interesting chain of thought engaging with public sector institutions. It is rooted in core MSD wisdom alluded to earlier in this therefore important to engage early on exit comes at entry. The search for appropriate institutional partners and involve them actively in anchoring institutions to enable the knowledge, the initial generation of the experience to increase approaches and capacities to be generated in a MSD ownership. At the same time, it is important to programme ... programme – engage beyond selected documents and key can start right at the beginning of programme processes, and to invest into people within the implementation. This would allow anchoring institution to ensure the legacy of an internal partners to be part of the process of the generation of adaptive capacity to further develop the experiences. experiences, to be integrated into the programme Whether or not to engage with anchoring institutions set-up and team, and to be part of an intensive journey of capacity building and learning. This may be possible with a national level think tank, with a more distant interconnected market systems) is in university, or more specifically in the case of MRM the end a political decision to be taken at donor level with a research firm, such as Nielsen. The authors and as such cannot be generalised. It very much believe that such ideas should be much more explored when designing new programmes, as they depend on the country context and the overall portfolio of a specific donor or the development are at the core of the very mandate of any community as a whole. If it is decided to invest into it, international development actor: to leave capable then it is important to acknowledge that it cannot be measured with the same yardstick, the same change.

ANNEXURES
Annex 1:

Institutional anchoring experience with thirteen Katalyst partner institutions

Anchoring institutions

- Bangladesh Agricultural University (BAU)
- Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Agricultural University (BSMRAU)
- Sylhet Agricultural University (SAU)
- Sher-e-Bangla Agricultural University (SBAU)

Institutional cluster

Reason for selection

- Potential to produce future decision-makers in agriculture-related public sector and private sector organisations
- Incentives to improve employability of their students and improve overall reputation
- Revision of selected course curricula at undergraduate level integrating Katalyst field cases
- Workshops between academia and private sector to identify skills gaps in graduates and to identify ways to fill them
- Organisation of job fairs linking students to potential future employers
- Facilitation of process
- Suggestion of cases and provision of technical assistance
- Co-financing of process
- Provision of time and human resources
- Revision of curricula integrating Katalyst cases
- Application of course material

Role of Katalyst

- By having more inclusive business oriented curricula in agriculture universities in Bangladesh, and better linkages between academia and agriculture-related private sector, more pro-poor growth friendly management staff will be produced for private and public sector organisations providing services to the poor
- At the same time, through better linkages between universities and agriculture-related private sector companies and the involvement of the industry in the curricula review process, curricula become more relevant and final graduates more employable.

Role of anchoring institution

- Change owner is not the experience owner; buy-in is therefore more difficult
- Inertia in terms of culture change in academia; pace of change is therefore slow
- Course curricula are being implemented; not possible to judge the quality of the implementation
- Industry linkages appear to bear fruit, as in 2017 all students obtain internships in private companies; lack of interest prior to Katalyst's intervention meant this was not the case
- Around 10%-20% of the revised course material is strongly influenced by Katalyst
- Cannot be assumed that the integration of case studies/reference material at undergraduate level will lead to behavioural change and more inclusive business practices in Bangladesh several years down the line (the result chain is very long)

Evidence for change

- 2018: first graduates from BSMRAU 'influenced' by Katalyst course material – 50
- 2019: first graduates from SBAU 'influenced' by Katalyst course material – 100

Evidence for significance of change

- Change owner is not the experience owner; buy-in is therefore more difficult
- Inertia in terms of culture change in academia; pace of change is therefore slow
- Course curricula are being implemented; not possible to judge the quality of the implementation

Evidence for sustainability of change

- Industry linkages appear to bear fruit, as in 2017 all students obtain internships in private companies; lack of interest prior to Katalyst's intervention meant this was not the case
- Around 10%-20% of the revised course material is strongly influenced by Katalyst
- Cannot be assumed that the integration of case studies/reference material at undergraduate level will lead to behavioural change and more inclusive business practices in Bangladesh several years down the line (the result chain is very long)

Enablers of change/change triggers

- Alignment of incentives of anchoring intervention to institutional goals of placing more of their students in jobs, having access to more internship and research possibilities
- Age of university clearly influenced adoption rate: younger universities tend to be much keener to change than older, established universities

Leaving a Legacy

How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh - A Case Study
## Annex 1: Institutional anchoring experience with thirteen Katalyst partner institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring Institutions</th>
<th>Bangladesh Agricultural University (BAU), Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Agricultural University (BSMRAU), Sylhet Agricultural University (SAU), Sher-e-Bangla Agricultural University (SBAU)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional cluster</td>
<td>Agricultural academia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Reason for selection   | • Potential to produce future decision-makers in agriculture-related public sector and private sector organisations  
                          • Incentives to improve employability of their students and improve overall reputation |
| Interventions carried out with anchoring institution | • Revision of selected course curricula at undergraduate level integrating Katalyst field cases  
                                                        • Workshops between academia and private sector to identify skills gaps in graduates and to identify ways to fill them  
                                                        • Organisation of job fairs linking students to potential future employers |
| Role of Katalyst        | • Facilitation of process  
                          • Suggestion of cases and provision of technical assistance  
                          • Co-financing of process |
| Role of anchoring institution | • Provision of time and human resources  
                              • Revision of curricula integrating Katalyst cases  
                              • Application of course material |
| Theory of change for the particular intervention | • By having more i) inclusive business oriented curricula in agriculture universities in Bangladesh, and ii) better linkages between academia and agriculture-related private sector, more pro-poor growth friendly management staff will be produced for private and public sector organisations providing services to the poor  
                                                        • At the same time, through better linkages between universities and agriculture-related private sector companies and the involvement of the industry in the curricula review process, curricula become more relevant and final graduates more employable. |
| Potential outreach      | • 2018: first graduates from BSMRAU ‘influenced’ by Katalyst course material – 50  
                          • 2019: first graduates from SBAU ‘influenced’ by Katalyst course material – 100 |
| Assessment of process   | • Change owner is not the experience owner; buy-in is therefore more difficult  
                          • Inertia in terms of culture change in academia; pace of change is therefore slow |
| Evidence for change     | • Course curricula are being implemented; not possible to judge the quality of the implementation  
                          • Industry linkages appear to bear fruit, as in 2017 all students obtain internships in private companies; lack of interest prior to Katalyst’s intervention meant this was not the case |
| Evidence for significance of change | • Around 10%-20% of the revised course material is strongly influenced by Katalyst  
                                           • Cannot be assumed that the integration of case studies/reference material at undergraduate level will lead to behavioural change and more inclusive business practices in Bangladesh several years down the line (the result chain is very long)  
                                           • Most significant change is an increased tendency to collaborate with private sector |
| Evidence for sustainability of change | • Difficult to assess. It would have been valuable to have more time available to accompany the implementation process and to invest in the training of teachers, as the quality of the course material very much depends on the way it is taught  
                                           • Not possible to change the culture of established institutions; sustainability of the instigated change may thus be compromised |
| Enablers of change/change triggers | • Alignment of incentives of anchoring intervention to institutional goals of placing more of their students in jobs, having access to more internship and research possibilities  
                                           • Age of university clearly influenced adoption rate: younger universities tend to be much keener to change than older, established universities |
<table>
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<th>Anchoring institutions</th>
<th>Bangladesh Agricultural University (BAU), Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Agricultural University (BSMRAU), Sylhet Agricultural University (SAU), Sher-e-Bangla Agricultural University (SBAU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|                        | • Ownership created on the part of instructors because they themselves wrote/referenced the case material  
|                        | • Financial/technical support for facilitation of events/workshops                                                                                                                                     |
| Restrainers of change  | • Some older universities and established academics appear uninterested in change  
|                        | • Processes, systems and structures change only very slowly in academic institutions; highly complex and slow processes (has to go through various levels until it is approved)  
<p>|                        | • Change is mainly anchored at the level of a certain department, but less with the overall management                                                                                               |
| Learning from work with the agri academia cluster | Katalyst intervention caters to a clear need to bring universities and potential future university employers closer to each other. Job fair and the involvement of private sector in curriculum assessment and improvement, important ‘seeds’ have been planted. More time/broader intervention portfolio with the agriculture academia would have been valuable to bring about deeper institutional culture change. This is very ambitious for a programme which has institutional anchoring as an additional mandate to its core mandate of MSD. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Anchoring institution</th>
<th>Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional cluster</strong></td>
<td><strong>Public sector service provider</strong></td>
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</table>
| Reason for selection | • Biggest extension service in the country with an outreach to around 28 Million farmer households  
• Existing partner of Katalyst sector interventions |
| Interventions carried out with anchoring institution | • Incentives of improving own service delivery and improve fulfilment of own mandate  
• Revision of DAE extension manual for the first time in 15 years, to include public-private partnership, gender equality, climate change  
• Training of 10 DAE master trainers; support given to ToT of 160 district training officers  
• Facilitation of training of all upazila level officials (500+) by DAE |
| Role of Katalyst | • Facilitation of process  
• Integration of key topics and cases into manual |
| Role of anchoring institution | • Co-financing of process  
• Provision of time and human resources for revision  
• Provision of master trainers  
• Conducting of training at district, upazila and union levels |
| Theory of change for the particular intervention | • Through i) the revision of the DAE service delivery manual and the inclusion of topics related to inclusive business, and ii) an accompanying training programme, public extension services become more effective and efficient, ultimately benefitting female and male farmers |
| Potential outreach | • Potential outreach of this intervention is significant. Over the next two years 14,000 SAAOs are expected to receive training based on this manual, each reaching 900-1200 farmers, resulting in outreach of around 16.8 million farmer households |
| Assessment of process | • Anchoring process appears successful. DAE manual has been fully revised; district level training has taken place with mainly positive feedback from DAE officials involved and DAE management |
| Evidence for change | • DAE has printed the manual which includes Katalyst experiences and distributed it throughout Bangladesh. Katalyst and donor logos are prominently placed on the front of the manual.  
• Training has taken place at district level; training at upazila level is scheduled for completion by December 2017 |
| Evidence for significance of change | • Revision of the manual for the first time in 15 years is significant per se  
• Anchoring of a process and capacities for manual revision and training is of significance; it is less important to examine the precise influence of Katalyst on the content of the manual (although significant contributions could be made here, e.g. integration of gender equality in agriculture, public private partnerships, climate change) |
| Evidence for sustainability of change | • The DAE manual is the main evidence book for all DAE officials for at least the next five years  
• Training capacity is built up with 10 master trainers and 160 district level trainers, building a broad human resource base capable of carrying forward the training of the content of the manual |
| Enablers of change/change triggers | • Previous Katalyst involvement with DAE in several interventions supported entry into DAE at a high level and adoption of some of the experiences (DAE is an experience co-owner)  
• Strong personal connections of Katalyst to the former DAE DG – who was previously involved in Katalyst interventions – certainly strengthened buy at high level  
• Revision of the DAE manual was overdue and Katalyst spotted the opportunity and the entry point to engage  
• Incentives of Katalyst and DAE for improved extension service delivery very much aligned |
### Anchoring institution: Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE)

- The DAE experience was pushed top-down from central level to the field level through the training cascade, while at the same time a large number of DAE officers at upazila level officer have made positive experience with the LAN experience of Katalyst; this may further strengthen adoption of the manual's specific recommendations.

### Restrainers of change

- Internal bureaucratic process within DAE may have slowed down adoption process of the changes to a certain extent.
- Engagement between rather young Katalyst staff mainly coming in with a private sector lens and drive engaging with rather senior DAE officials operating within a bureaucratic and rather change resistant government system may have posed certain challenges at first until trust was established.

### Learning from work with DAE

- DAE example is a good example of Katalyst having been able to approach the DAE at the right time with the right offer. It was important to have a strong personal connection to the DG of the DAE who received Katalyst with an open door. It also clearly shows the importance of having the anchoring institution involved in the actual generation of experiences, as this increases buy-in and ownership.
## Anchoring institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for selection</th>
<th>Interventions carried out with anchoring institution</th>
<th>Role of Katalyst</th>
<th>Role of anchoring institution</th>
<th>Theory of change for the particular intervention</th>
<th>Potential outreach</th>
<th>Assessment of process</th>
<th>Evidence for change</th>
<th>Evidence for significance of change</th>
<th>Evidence for sustainability of change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Through its deep penetration into rural areas of Bangladesh, PKSF and its member organisations are in an excellent position to cover last-mile service delivery to farmers | • Jointly develop i) training modules on vegetable cultivation/post-harvest management techniques, and ii) promotional items (e.g. training video) to be used by MFIs in Bangladesh  
• Develop capacities of PKSF to capacitate MFIs in vegetable cultivation/post-harvest management techniques  
• Promote vegetable cultivation/post-harvest management techniques through PKSF as embedded services to relevant stakeholders, including MFIs, public agencies and private companies, and donors. | • Facilitate process of improving embedded services through MFIs  
• Promote dissemination of embedded services; provide technical assistance  
• Co-finance process | • Provision of time/human resources  
• Revision of the existing module  
• Capacity development of MFIs on the vegetable cultivation and post-harvest management techniques | • By embedding non-financial services into the service portfolio of MFIs and anchoring respective expertise with the main microfinance apex body, farmers get access to unbiased advice, which they may otherwise not get from private companies (biased) or the DAE extension services (lack of resources) | • 50 MFIs, who are associated with agriculture unit of PKSF, will be receiving capacity development support from PKSF to disseminate vegetable cultivation and post-harvest management techniques as non-financial embedded services across the country. Other MFIs, around 150, may also replicate vegetable cultivation and post-harvest management techniques in future. | • The anchoring process appears to be successful, as PKSF has signed an agreement with Katalyst for ToT and further roll-out throughout the country | • Joint update of module completed with extensive PKSF feedback  
• ToT provided to PSKF’s Agriculture unit  
• Training of initial 15 MFIs will be completed in December 2017) | • Model likely to be taken up by others; it may support the filling of an important last-mile service delivery gap prevalent in Bangladesh  
• Hard to assess whether the Katalyst pilot related to profitable vegetable patterns will also influence the inclusion of additional non-financial services in PKSF’s portfolio | • The seven MFIs who participated in initial phase are providing embedded agriculture services without further programme support  
• Integration of non-financial services is part of a new guideline endorsed by PKSF, providing a clear mandate from this main apex body to follow the example of the pilot MFIs  
• Longer-term engagement could have strengthened sustainability further by facilitating inclusion of additional non-financial services into PKSF’s MFI portfolios |
## Anhoring institution | Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF)
--- | ---
**Enablers of change/change triggers** | • The fact that seven MFIs were part of an intensive experience and have seen the benefits has strongly supported adoption  
• Intervention was clearly aligned with strong incentives for PKSF and the MFIs (increased loan recovery, customer loyalty, policy guideline to include non-financial services)

**Restrainers of change** | • PKSF as an organisation receives substantial funding from various donor agencies; collaboration with Katalyst was much less attractive in terms of budget  
• Katalyst’s way of working is different from other development programmes and it took PKSF some time to fully grasp the delivery logic of the programme

**Learning from work with PKSF** | A longer-term engagement (in this case, over three years) facilitates adoption of practices, particularly if the experience is based on tested evidence on the ground (experience owner = change owner). The choice of PKSF was the right one from a systemic change perspective, as this has the chance to influence policymakers and other MFIs.  
If purely motivated by quantitative logframe targets to be delivered within a short timeframe, other partners such as BRAC, ASA, Proshika could have produced similar results with a simpler organisation structure and process but less influence on overall system.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring institution</th>
<th>American International University of Bangladesh (AIUB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional cluster</strong></td>
<td>Academia focusing on Business Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Reason for selection** | • Potential to produce future decision-makers and business graduates in agriculture-related public and private sectors  
• Potential to improve employment opportunities for students: this is the only private university offering business courses for agro-based products/rural marketing  
• Potential to improve overall reputation of the university |
| **Interventions carried out with anchoring institution** | • Workshops bringing together academia and private sector to identify graduate skills gaps and ways to fill them  
• Two courses introduced (Agro-Based Product Marketing and Product Innovation and Management) |
| **Role of Katalyst** | • Facilitation of process and provision of technical assistance  
• Co-financing  
• Organising workshop participated in by international experts, representatives from academia, private sector organisations |
| **Role of anchoring institution** | • Provision of time/human resources for development of course content  
• Co-financing  
• Delivery of courses |
| **Theory of change for the particular intervention** | • Introduction into business schools of courses (Agro-Based Product Marketing and Product Innovation and Management) that contain Bangladesh cases will produce pro-poor-growth-friendly management staff in the private sector. This will make service delivery to the poor more efficient, effective and relevant  
• Better linkages with the private sector and participation of private sector business entrepreneurs as guest lecturers will allow students to understand real-life challenges and make graduates more employable |
| **Potential outreach** | • 75 students per year at undergraduate level |
| **Assessment of process** | • Anchoring appears to have worked successfully. Staff and Dean of business studies are enthusiastic; both courses have been delivered once to undergraduate students |
| **Evidence for change** | • Both courses have been introduced and delivered. Teaching staff are very enthusiastic about the courses. Although they have been so far offered only at undergraduate level, there are plans to deliver them in revised form at graduate level  
• Industry linkages are working, as students obtain more and better internship opportunities in agro-industry |
| **Evidence for significance of change** | • Instructors appeared highly enthusiastic and to have acquired several learnings from the experience of integrating the courses into their overall practices  
• Katalyst’s actual contribution (case studies) to course content is probably less significant in comparison with the overall course content. However, the process of developing courses in close collaboration with the industry is significant and is bearing fruit |
| **Evidence for sustainability of change** | • The two developed courses have been included in those offered to undergraduate students; demand is high, meaning they will continue to be taught  
• Clear demand from students to avail the courses at a higher level has led the university to revise content for this purpose  
• Challenges to sustainability relate to the difficulty of finding guest industry lecturers |
| **Enablers of change/change triggers** | • Course approval process in a private university is far less complicated than that in public universities  
• Prior involvement of AIUB with Katalyst in 2009 supported buy-in  
• Demand for the introduction of new courses came directly from AIUB as part of Katalyst’s challenge fund initiative, increasing ownership  
• Katalyst’s provision of financial and technical support enabled change |
### Anchoring institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American International University of Bangladesh (AIUB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• University has established feedback mechanisms with students (‘paying customers’). This helped it to adapt to demand and ensure delivery of more relevant courses (e.g. inclusion of local [not only international] cases)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Restrainers of change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learning from work with AIUB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of exposure/training of faculty members in terms of course content may restrain the quality of change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Challenges in terms of relating to the industry and in bringing in guest lecturers have somewhat reduced relevance of courses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Courses were largely offered at undergraduate level; this will result in reduced effect on behaviour of future decision-makers, who are still comparably far away from the job market at the time of learning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The AIUB case is one of the few examples where anchoring interventions were based on direct demand from the anchoring institution, which was also willing to put in its own resources. This increases likelihood and sustainability for change. Stronger investments in teaching capacities and teacher training would probably have strengthened sustainability and significance of change; this may be a valuable consideration for future/other programmes.
## How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh - A Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring institution</th>
<th>National Academy for Planning and Development (NAPD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional cluster</strong></td>
<td>Public sector training institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for selection</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | • NAPD provides training to officials from the economic cadre (among others) with the potential to take an important role in designing national planning, development policies and strategies  
• NAPD has a broad outreach to key decision-makers in the public sector |
| **Interventions carried out with anchoring institution** |  |
| | • Development of a short training course on public-private partnerships integrating aspects of inclusive business development  
• Support to NAPD in redesigning the post-graduate diploma course on economic development |
| **Role of Katalyst** |  |
| | • Facilitation of process of designing short training and post-graduate diploma course  
• Suggestion of cases and provision of technical assistance |
| **Role of anchoring institution** |  |
| | • Provision of time/human resource support |
| **Theory of change for the particular intervention** |  |
| | • By integrating more inclusive business content into training courses for future public sector decision-makers, policies, strategies and decisions are made more in favour of inclusive business, creating a more enabling environment for private sector and farmers |
| **Potential outreach** |  |
| | • 25 government officials per year |
| **Assessment of process** |  |
| | • Change owner is not the experience owner  
• Initially, NAPD officials had a very limited idea of the Katalyst approach and therefore had a lack of interest in working with Katalyst. Katalyst worked to prove itself by completing a short course, earning the trust needed to revise the post-graduate course |
| **Evidence for change** |  |
| | • One short training course has been completed. Feedback from the participating 25 government officials was extremely positive; this course has now been formally included in the NAPD training calendar  
• Modules for the post-graduate course have already been redesigned and will be implemented in 2018 |
| **Evidence for significance of change** |  |
| | • Significance of change cannot yet be assessed. Just one or two key public sector officials applying their knowledge in their future roles may be significant, depending on their position |
| **Evidence for sustainability of change** |  |
| | • Short training courses and PGD-DP programme with revised contents have already become part of NAPD’s organisational training calendars indicating the organisation’s commitment to continue them. |
| **Enablers of change/change triggers** |  |
| | • Katayst had to prove itself by completing a short course before being allowed to work ‘deeper’ in NAPD; experience owner = change owner!  
• Identification of change agent or champion within NAPD with the influence, interest and incentive to support Katalyst  
• Focus on PPPs and private sector development as reflected in national planning documents (e.g. 7th FYP, Perspective Plan, 2010-21) may have influenced NAPD in understanding the value of Katalyst’s interventions |
| **Restainers of change** |  |
| | • Lack of prior working experience of Katalyst/Katalyst’s lack of credibility with NAPD |
| **Learning from the work with NAPD** |  |
| | The NAPD case shows the importance of access/entry into an institution, particularly one which is culturally far away from the private sector-minded Katalyst. It proved necessary to gain access via a short course, before being able to support work on the post-diploma course, as Katalyst initially planned. This shows the importance of flexibility and adaptability when working in particular with public sector institutions. If more time had been available, Katalyst would perhaps now be in a position to approach again some of the key partners who did not buy into collaboration, such as PATC. Using the NAPD experience (and possibly some NAPD champions) may help to convince PATC to engage with Katalyst. |
## Anchoring institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional cluster</th>
<th>Rural Development Academy (RDA)</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| **Reason for selection** | Potential to produce future management-level employees in agriculture and rural development-related public and private sectors  
  Incentives to improve employability of their students and improve overall reputation |
| **Interventions carried out with anchoring institution** | Revision of postgraduate diploma course in Rural Development, making it more job-oriented and focused on inclusive rural development  
  Public-private dialogue events with the private sector to align interests of both actors  
  Workshops involving academia (BSMRAU), RDA and private sector to identify i) skills gaps in diploma students and ii) ways to fill them |
| **Role of Katalyst** | Facilitation of process  
  Suggestion of cases and provision of technical assistance  
  Co-financing |
| **Role of anchoring institution** | Provision of time/human resources  
  Revision of curricula integrating Katalyst cases  
  Application of course material |
| **Theory of change for the particular intervention** | By having more inclusive business-oriented curricula in RDA and by having better linkages between RDA and agriculture-related private sector, more pro-poor growth friendly management staff will be produced for private and public sector organisations providing services to the poor  
  At the same time, through better linkages between RDA and agriculture-related private sector companies and the involvement of the industry in the course review process, course content becomes more relevant and final graduates more employable. |
| **Potential outreach** | First graduates in 2018; 25 per year after that |
| **Assessment of process** | Change owner is not the experience owner. This made buy-in slightly challenging; however, it was facilitated through previous exposure of RDA to Swisscontact (M4C programme)  
  Once collaboration was established, the process of revision was very effective; however, it will take RDA time to build up a reputation of being more practical and business-oriented (see needs assessments carried out by Katalyst) |
| **Evidence for change** | Course curricula have changed drastically; 75% of course materials are new and strongly influenced by Katalyst  
  Industry linkages appear to have borne fruit; in 2017, 16 students were placed in private companies (including ACI, RahimAfroz) |
| **Evidence for significance of change** | 60-70% of the revised course material is strongly influenced by Katalyst  
  It is far-fetched to assume that the integration of some case studies and reference material will lead to behavioural change and more inclusive business practices in Bangladesh several years down the line (very long result chain)  
  Most significant change is an increased tendency to collaborate with private sector |
| **Evidence for sustainability of change** | Sustainability of the change is difficult to assess, but it would have been valuable to have more time available to actually accompany the implementation process and to invest time into the training of teachers, as the quality of the course material very much depends on the way it is taught  
  It also not possible to really change institutional culture in such rather established and proud institutions, which may limit sustainability of the instigated change to a certain extent |
<p>| <strong>Enablers of change/change triggers</strong> | Alignment of incentives of anchoring intervention to institutional goals of placing more of their students in jobs, having access to more internship and research possibilities |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring institution</th>
<th>Rural Development Academy (RDA)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The fact that it was a postgraduate diploma (rather than a university-level degree) programme allowed RDA to introduce changes in an efficient manner</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Creating ownership on the part of instructors by having them write and reference the case material</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Katalyst provision of financial/technical support for facilitation of events and workshops</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Change initiative has been anchored within RDA’s management structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrainers of change</td>
<td>• Some older universities/established academics are uninterested in changing, and RDA is strongly linked to universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capacities at the instructor level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Building up a reputation for producing more employable students will take time; this may affect commitment of RDA in the medium term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning from work with RDA</td>
<td>Katalyst’s intervention caters to a clear need to bring training institutions and potential future university employers closer together. With interventions such as the involvement of private sector in curriculum assessment and improvement, important ‘seeds’ have been planted by Katalyst. Concerns remain about sustainability of the initiative, as absence of a definite mechanism for regular revision of the curriculum may discourage faculty members from updating course contents. Lack of capacity at instructor level may constitute a risk of content not being transferred in the right manner to students.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchoring institution</td>
<td>Krishibid Institution of Bangladesh (KIB)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional cluster</strong></td>
<td>Membership organisation</td>
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</table>
| **Reason for selection** | • Largest professional organisation for agriculturalists, with a total membership base of more than 12,000  
• Almost every top-level policymaker and agriculture sector expert belong to KIB, making it a highly appropriate entry point for influencing current and future policymakers of the sector  
• KIB has incentives to improve overall reputation and improve visibility |
| **Interventions carried-out with anchoring institution** | • Introduction of the Krishibid Podok (Krishibid Award) for integrating key topics for inclusive business in agriculture  
• Organisation of national-level job fair, participated in by 100+ private sector organisations and all of Bangladesh’s agriculture universities |
| **Role of Katalyst** | • Facilitation of process  
• Co-financing of award for first two years |
| **Role of the anchoring institution** | • Provision of time/human resources  
• Developing a system to introduce the award  
• Organising of job fair  
• Financing award and job fair process |
| **Theory of change for the particular intervention** | • High-level recognition (award is presented by the President of Bangladesh), which i) motivates KIB members to invest in more inclusive business practices/service delivery in Bangladesh, and ii) strengthens overall awareness for more inclusive business practices  
• Organisation of a national job fair improves links of university graduates with private sector companies; universities and private sector better understand each others’ needs. |
| **Potential outreach** | • Strengthened awareness of 12,000 members, and general public through newspaper and television coverage  
• Outreach to at least 100 private sector companies and several thousand agriculture university students |
| **Assessment of process** | • Change owner is the experience owner, as the award and career event were introduced jointly |
| **Evidence for change** | • Number of applications for award nomination increased gradually (almost 50 nominations submitted in 2017, the third time the award was given)  
• National-level recognition (the Bangladesh President presented the most recent award)  
• Award-giving process has been institutionalised and taken place without further Katalyst support  
• Job fair is yet to take place so impact cannot be assessed |
| **Evidence for significance of change** | • Award is significant, indicated by i) attendance of the President at award-giving ceremony, and ii) increasing number of applications for award  
• Not possible to establish direct link with significant behavioural changes  
• Significant that organisation of the job fair will be financed mainly by KIB and fair participants |
| **Evidence for sustainability of change** | • Award has been taken up and financed by KIB  
• Job fair is likely to be sustainable; however, this depends on the success of the first fair, conducted at end of 2017. KIB has expressed a commitment to continue it |
| **Enablers of change/change triggers** | • Buy-in from top level leadership with previous exposure to Katalyst  
• Financial/technical support  
• Alignment of incentives with KIB’s core mandate |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring institution</th>
<th>Krishibid Institution of Bangladesh (KIB)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Restrainers of change** | - Some internal resistance; an award already existed and could have been undermined by the KIB award  
- Internal politics |
<p>| <strong>Learning from work with KIB</strong> | The KIB case is another example of Katalyst having found the right institution with the right incentives for participation. Katalyst used the right high-level entry point to obtain access to decision-makers and proved that the award works on the ground. With the buy in from KIB, Katalyst support is no longer necessary. It also shows the difference in the character of the intervention (a concrete product, needing little human resource capacity to be delivered) and in the nature of the KIB institution, which is membership-based and less resistant to change than an older public sector institution. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring institution</th>
<th>Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute (BARI)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional cluster</strong></td>
<td>Public sector service provider</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Reason for selection** | • Summer maize was proved to have potential as a new crop based on Katalyst experiences; it requires a technical guideline for profitable cultivation practice  
• BARI is the main public sector agricultural research body with authority to release guidelines for new crops; without BARI endorsement, private sector/farmers are reluctant to follow the summer specific cultivation technique |
| **Interventions carried out with anchoring institution** | • Jointly develop existing research/outcomes on summer maize cultivation  
• Promote accumulated learnings among relevant research organisations via modules |
| **Role of Katalyst** | • Provide technical assistance to prepare compilation of summer maize research  
• Facilitation of process  
• Financing of process |
| **Role of anchoring institution** | • Provision of time/human resources |
| **Theory of change for the particular intervention** | • Through development and release of a guideline for summer maize by BARI, private sector service providers and farmers be incentivised to invest in summer maize, leading to increased livelihood security and income for farmers |
| **Potential outreach** | • Up to 100,000 farmers |
| **Assessment of process** | • Process is very difficult and slow. Various departments within BARI need to be involved but practice of collaboration does not exist  
• Interest varies among different divisions of BARI |
| **Evidence for change** | • In September 2017, Katalyst signed Letter of Agreement for the BARI collaboration, a sure sign that progress will happen |
| **Evidence for significance of change** | • Limited. If the intervention leads BARI to understand the value of collaborating across departments, this would be an important change. However, this is only likely to happen if top-level management buys into the process; this is currently not apparent |
| **Evidence for sustainability of change** | • Limited |
| **Enablers of change/change triggers** | • Use of an influential ‘door openers’ |
| **Restrainers of change** | • Internal organisation and culture  
• Limited alignment with BARI’s core mandate and targets |
<p>| <strong>Learning from work with BARI</strong> | The intervention with BARI is close to Katalyst’s core sector work in the maize sector and therefore close to the programme’s core mandate. The case of BARI demonstrates the importance of being able to align institutional mandates and incentives; it also illustrates the difficulties of changing institutional cultures. Just as Katalyst is about to close down its operations, the work with BARI seems to have picked up speed, again providing a strong argument for allocating enough time for engagement with a public sector partner. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring institution</th>
<th>Business Promotion Council (BPC)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional cluster</strong></td>
<td>Public sector organisation focusing on product-specific sector export promotion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Reasons for selection** | • BPC is Katalyst’s formal government counterpart. It has been involved since Phase 1  
• BPC is a special unit created by the Ministry of Commerce with a mandate to enhance export readiness, export promotion and diversification through public-private partnership principally dedicated to taking care of supply side constraints. Given BPC’s broad mandate for export promotion, anchoring intervention will have a long-term effect  
• BPC has the mandate and capacity to influence market development practices in several sectors including leather, fisheries and agro-products. This capacity to influence made BPC a viable candidate for institutional anchoring  
• BPC has strong incentives to improve its own service delivery and to better fulfil its mandate |
| **Interventions carried out with anchoring institution** | • Introduction of contract farming modules for the export of perishable products (e.g. agro-products, fishery products)  
• Organisational development and strengthening of BPC |
| **Role of Katalyst** | • Facilitation of process  
• Financing of process  
• Provision of technical inputs/experience to develop the module  
• Organisational development support |
| **Role of anchoring institution** | • Provision of time/human resources |
| **Theory of change for particular intervention** | • Development of contract farming module for perishable vegetable/fishery products will enable BPC to support its membership associations to become more export ready and eventually export agro and fishery products to other countries, supporting the growth of the Bangladesh economy and contributing to improved incomes at farmer level. At the same time, organisational strengthening will enable BPC to deliver better services for its other sectors of focus |
| **Potential outreach** | • Difficult to assess, but significant through BPC’s model character and influence on other sectors nationwide |
| **Assessment of process** | • Good progress appears to have been made; a module for contract farming has been developed |
| **Evidence for process** | • Module is developed; buy-in from BPC members is apparent |
| **Evidence for significance of change** | • Not yet available |
| **Evidence for sustainability of change** | • Not yet available. Likely to be high, as BPC is a crucial market systems player in export promotion |
| **Enablers of change/change triggers** | • BPC is the main public project counterpart  
• Previous Katalyst involvement with BPC in several interventions supported i) the programme’s high level entry into BPC, and ii) adoption of some of the experiences  
• Incentives for Katalyst and BPC to enhance export readiness and competitiveness are very much aligned |
<p>| <strong>Restrainers of change</strong> | • Internal bureaucratic process within BPC and Ministry of Commerce may have slowed down the adoption process of the module to some extent |
| <strong>Learning from work with the BPC</strong> | • That a concrete intervention (contract farming) very much aligned with the core mandate of the BPC has been conducted in combination with organisational support increases chances for change and sustainability. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchoring institution</th>
<th>Nielsen</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional cluster</td>
<td>Private service provider</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Reason for selection  | • Nielsen is the leading research firm in Bangladesh; however, it lacked i) in-house expertise in terms of agriculture-based research in Bangladesh which would be of use for private sector companies, and ii) public sector and development partners
|                      | • Katalyst saw an opportunity for building capacity within Nielsen to be able to conduct sound market research which helps service providers to deliver better services to farmers |
| Interventions carried out with anchoring institution | • Building up an internal qualitative research unit with special expertise in agricultural research |
| Role of Katalyst      | • Facilitation of process
|                      | • Capacity building through MRM team
|                      | • Co-financing |
| Role of anchoring institution | • Provision of time/human resources
|                      | • Co-financing |
| Theory of change for the particular intervention | • With a better capacity to provide good quality agricultural market research, private sector, public sector and development partners would pay for services from Nielsen who then would provide high quality research data, leading to better service provision to farmers |
| Potential outreach    | • Indirect, but potentially substantial |
| Assessment of process | • Collaboration has slowed because of the leaving of the main contact person in Nielsen |
| Evidence for change   | • Nielsen has continued to invest in its own internal agriculture research capacities, bringing in experts from its India office
|                      | • Demand for services continues to be rather limited |
| Evidence for significance of change | • Limited |
| Evidence for sustainability of change | • Nielsen has continued to invest in its in-house capacities; however, without clients paying for services, sustainability will be limited |
| Enablers of change/change triggers | • Aligned incentives and mandates
|                      | • Having the right contact person |
| Restrainers of change | • Change in key contact personnel
|                      | • Lack of business case for original idea. With no real demand for services, it is unlikely to survive |
| Learning from work with Nielsen | The Nielsen case shows the importance of people in institutional anchoring work, as the collaboration broke down after the key contact person left. Collaborating with a team rather than an individual may mitigate against such risks; however, this is not always in the control of a programme. It would have been of interest to assess the possibility of a more intense collaboration on MRM in general with Nielsen members and the Katalyst MRM team working much more closely together throughout the lifetime of the programme. |
### Annex 2: List of interviewees during the field mission in Bangladesh

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr.</th>
<th>Name of person</th>
<th>Position / Designation</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dr. Md. Kamruzzaman</td>
<td>Professor and Head Department of Agricultural Economics</td>
<td>Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Agricultural University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Professor Noor Md. Rahmatullah</td>
<td>Dean Faculty of Agribusiness Management Professor &amp; former Chairman, Deptartment of Agricultural Statistics</td>
<td>Sher-e-Bangla Agricultural University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Md. Hamidur Rahman</td>
<td>Former Director General</td>
<td>Department of Agricultural Extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former Vice President</td>
<td>Krishibid Institution</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Md. Mobarak Ali</td>
<td>Former Director General</td>
<td>Department of Agricultural Extension</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Former Secretary General</td>
<td>Krishibid Institution</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>M.A. Matin</td>
<td>Director General</td>
<td>Rural Development Academy, Bogra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Dr. Charles C. Villanueva</td>
<td>Dean, Faculty of Business Administration</td>
<td>American International University-Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dr. Sahin Akter Sarker</td>
<td>Faculty member, Faculty of Business Administration</td>
<td>American International University-Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hamidul Islam</td>
<td>Faculty member, Faculty of Business Administration</td>
<td>American International University-Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Saihad Shahid Rahman</td>
<td>Faculty member, Faculty of Business Administration</td>
<td>American International University-Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Tahsina Nimmi Khan</td>
<td>Faculty member, Faculty of Business Administration</td>
<td>American International University-Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Stanley Sumon Rodrick</td>
<td>Faculty member, Faculty of Business Administration</td>
<td>American International University-Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Umesh Jha</td>
<td>Director, Consumer Insights</td>
<td>The Nielsen Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
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Leaving a Legacy
How Katalyst has captured its learning and anchored its experiences in Bangladesh - A Case Study
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